

# “Housekeeper or Village Idiot?” Spanish Municipalities in Transition from Dictatorship (1975-79)

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This paper addresses the swift political change in Spain after the death of general Franco in 1975. We briefly present the origin, nature, and evolution of the Francoist dictatorship; we discuss succinctly the main theories of democratization. And we have a closer look at events and actors in Spanish municipal life from November 1975 to April 1979: pseudo-democratic elections of mayors in 1976, the impact of the democratic general elections of 1977, the electoral campaign, and municipal elections of 1979. We believe that this focus on the local sphere sheds light on the process of democratic transition and provides a more nuanced explanation of the process of historical transformation in Spain. We also believe that these questions are valid within a broader and necessary discussion on democracy worldwide.

In the 1950s Spain was under a regime “sustained by the argument of Thomas Hobbes that any effective political order is better than no order, not so much because of its power and readiness to terrorize, but because nobody wanted another Civil War.”<sup>1</sup> Francisco Franco was able to seize power in Spain by taking part in a coup d’état in July 1936 against a democratically elected government. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), Franco became commander in-chief of the rebel army and head of the rebel Government. Those were meant to be temporary powers to achieve victory in the war. Once the conflict ended, however, Franco managed to retain those immense powers until his death in 1975.<sup>2</sup>

The nature of his regime defies easy definition, given its long duration. Most scholars agree that the following were key traits of the dictatorship: reactionary, Catholic, anti-Communist, nationalist, military. Fascism exercised a significant influence, particularly from the Civil War to the mid-1940s. After the Second World War and the defeat of the Axis powers, Franco’s regime evolved and removed most of its Fascist components. Although Franco was not keen on change, evolution, and adaptation to changing circumstances, in Spain and abroad, were crucial for the survival of his regime. Repression was another fundamental component of Francoism, and particularly intense during the 1940s when the regime

was able to deactivate and terrorize any possible source of opposition. For the remainder of the dictatorship's duration, repression remained active yet with less intensity, becoming more selective. Repression alone does not explain the duration of the regime, consent was also present within Spanish society, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and/or fear of the alternatives to Franco's dictatorship.<sup>3</sup>

Francoism, like all political regimes, needed a claim to legitimacy, a source of legitimization. For Franco that source was the victory in the Spanish Civil War, which had "saved" Spain from all its enemies: Communism, Atheism, Liberalism, Masonry, etcetera. The alternative to the dictatorship, Spaniards were told, was falling back into chaos, destruction, and fratricidal conflict. A poorly conceived economic policy of autarky led Spain to the brink of default by the late 1950s. Franco understood that a drastic change was needed to save the economy and his regime. The liberalization of Spanish economy led to a true "economic miracle" and gave the ageing dictator a new claim to legitimacy: efficiency and performance.<sup>4</sup>

In that context, what were the chances of democracy returning to Spain? Scholars attempting to explain what has facilitated the rise and consolidation of democratic regimes in the Modern world have highlighted various factors and actors: prosperity and income (Seymour M. Lipset), the interaction of collective actors and the transformation of the State (Barrington Moore), individual agency and leadership (Larry Diamond), the impact of globalization (Samuel P. Huntington). These approaches have been fruitful but have answered only in part the different democratic case studies across the world. We want to incorporate those various theories holistically into our analysis of transition in Spain, focusing on three central points stressed by Jean Grugel: the State, collective actors, and global factors.<sup>5</sup> The Spanish transition to the democracy has been generally considered a clear-cut example of agency and individual leadership theory, underlining the role of central actors in the upper echelons of the State and national politics.<sup>6</sup>

We believe that the picture will be clearer by also approaching the actors involved at other levels of the State and politics, namely those in the local and municipal sphere in transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain.

## MUNICIPAL LIFE IN FRANCOISM

Municipal life under the Franco regime was marked by the subordination of local corporations to the civil governor of the province and the Ministry of the Interior (where governors were appointed and dismissed). The mayors were appointed in a discretionary manner, while the councilors were elected in indirect elections of up to the fifth degree between 1948-1973. All this, together with referendums, and elections to *procuradores* (procurators, i.e., representatives) in the Francoist *Cortes* (parliament), made up

the so-called ‘organic democracy’. Spain under Franco had an alternative and, of course, improved version of Western democracy.

This legal and administrative framework, which initially arose from legislation enacted during the Spanish Civil War, could hardly address the transformation of Spanish society since the sixties, motivated by factors such as the rural exodus and an accelerated and chaotic urbanization. Neighborhood associations increasingly protested the shortage of housing, schools, etcetera, and later also incorporated political demands.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, the design of a post-Franco Spain led by younger generations has also been observed since the 1960s. In 1972 the Minister of the Interior, Tomás Garicano Goñi, was aware that the “war generations are in danger of disappearing”.<sup>8</sup> Juan Carlos was designated successor by Franco in 1969. The legitimacy of his monarchy after Franco’s death depended on its dissociation from the civil war. Clemente García points to similar reasons for his appointment in 1972 as mayor of Murcia, although he came from the National Movement and was secretary of the provincial branch of a Catholic lay organization in Murcia:

A generational change was taking place. Young people were coming into office (in my case, I was just 36 years old...); people who had not lived through the Civil War and who lacked intransigent attitudes towards those who belonged to one side or the other.<sup>9</sup>

It was a gradual generational renewal that took place in both the central and local spheres. The appointment of Fernando Parias as mayor of Seville in June 1975 was carried out with mechanisms of personal mediation, arbitrariness, and secrecy, within a framework that was formally ill-defined, but the outcome of which was predictable in practice. In other words, it would fit Juan J. Linz’s definition of an authoritarian regime.<sup>10</sup> The procedure was not necessarily predictable in the name of the candidate, but it was predictable in the profile. The election of the new mayor in 1975 was “very close”, but “not in the street, in full view of the people, but behind the scenes”.<sup>11</sup>

The mayors and municipalities were subject to the control and surveillance of the Civil Government, which was always on the lookout for possible irregularities or the opposition and reticence they might arouse in their locality. But not all mayors in Spain identified with the Falange or Movement, the Francoist single party in the final years of the dictatorship. Perhaps they did in small localities, but not in the larger ones. Particularly since the 1960s. As Fernando Parias pointed out years later: “I never wore the blue shirt” of the Falange, “the mayors of the big cities had a bull with the Movement. They respected us”.

It is interesting to analyze what the municipal political elites and cadres did during the final years of Franco’s regime, how they maneuvered in the face of the imminent “biological fact”—Franco’s

death—and in the years immediately after. One of the defining features of the Spanish transition was the will of its promoters to avoid a decentralized process that threatened to seriously hinder the negotiations and escape their control, so it seemed advisable to avoid a renewal of local powers that would have given rise to a multiplicity of actors in play and to direct the process from the central institutions. As Antonio Canales points out:

This left the men who made up the last Francoist corporations in an uncomfortable position as recipients of the hostility of the mobilized sectors, while the central and provincial authorities negotiated with these same forces. The role of the local political class was to remain at the head of the local institutions while the new political framework was being designed.<sup>12</sup>

## THE ELECTION OF MAYORS IN 1976 AND THE IMPACT OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1977

General Franco passed away November 20, 1975. Two days later, Juan Carlos became king of Spain and successor as head of State. Carlos Arias, appointed president by Franco in 1974, continued as head of the Cabinet. The new Law of Bases of Local Regime, ironically approved on November 19 after several years of discussions and delays, brought a new regulation of the election of the mayor (as well as the presidents of deputations and island councils) by the members of the corporation.<sup>13</sup> The indirect election of the mayor by the councilors meant only a superficial change. In the opinion of the then mayor of Murcia, it was:

inopportune and inappropriate in view of the socio-political circumstances that prevailed and that demanded greater openness to accommodate the pluralism that really existed. In short, it regulated the figure of the mayors of the transition.<sup>14</sup>

A group of Catalan councilors signed a petition to postpone the elections, and in Valladolid five capitulars wrote to Minister Fraga also requesting the postponement.<sup>15</sup> Many considered the 1976 elections a nonsense, being on the horizon the likelihood of a new political framework, still vague and poorly defined. Most municipal officials remained, perhaps to transmit the sensation of continuity, to assure the control of the City Councils in the face of the imminent and still ill-defined process of change, or perhaps out of simple inertia.

The government wanted to encourage the participation and the concurrence of candidates; this was a strategy also found in earlier municipal elections under Franco. The call for municipal and provincial elections constituted for the executive, presided over by Arias, stated:

a stage of notorious importance in the process of democratization of the representative institutions since the local corporations are fundamental cells of the political-administrative structure of the country and at the same time channels of participation in other institutions. The presentation of candidates should be promoted, and they should be able to present their program through the press, thus contributing to “creating a state of opinion.”<sup>16</sup>

In reality, the elections of 1976 could only lead to a limited democratization at best. Mayors were elected with the new procedure in slightly more than half of the Spanish municipalities.<sup>17</sup> In thirty-six of the forty-eight capitols the outgoing mayor stood for election (in fourteen as the only candidate), and in sixteen capitals the vote was not even necessary. In Malaga, Zaragoza, and Seville, four candidates ran, the highest number of all the Spanish provincial capitals where elections were held. In Valladolid there were only two candidates. In Algeciras and Jerez, two large municipalities in Cadiz, the mayors did not stand for re-election. In the provincial capitals and major cities thirty-nine mayors repeated their mandate, but only fourteen new mayors were elected. For the then mayor of Murcia, Clemente García, at the time

The idea was to remain in office for only ten months [because, according to the laws of the regime, councilors had to be renewed in the fall], but (...) the Government was authorized to postpone the local elections until after the first legislative elections, which it did against the opinion of those who at that time held positions of responsibility in the municipalities. Subsequently, this decision was postponed again until the approval of the Constitution in December 1978.<sup>18</sup>

The municipal elections were delayed for more than three years, for various reasons: the convenience of the government of Adolfo Suarez, appointed president by Juan Carlos after dismissing Arias; the lack of presence at the local level of all parties, including the left, although they insistently requested the call; the subordination to other processes such as the Law for Political Reform, then the general elections, and the approval of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the precedent of the 1931 municipal elections was also present, which had led to the proclamation of the II Spanish Republic. Political change would be made “from above” and “from the center,” maintaining control over the municipal sphere, and over the “sequence and priority of events,” in the words of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, to avoid the multiplication and atomization of actors.<sup>19</sup> Paul Preston argues that Franco’s regime was buried in June 1977, after the general elections:

An end announced for many years . . . . The obsolescence of the system had been clear for some time. Since the end of the sixties, a growing number of former Francoists had understood that this was the case.<sup>20</sup>

And yet, the local corporations appointed according to the rules of Franco’s dictatorship were still in place. The first democratic general elections in more than forty years had an enormous impact on the municipal sphere, whose undemocratic character was even more evident in contrast to the existence of newly elected representatives in each province. From June 1977 onwards, the opposition forces increased their demands in the municipalities; and the latter, for their part, insistently requested the holding of democratic municipal elections. A reflection of the new scenario was the motion on municipal policy approved by the Seville City Council after the general elections:

1. To express to the Crown -the true driving force of the democratizing process- and to the Government, our satisfaction with the development of the Electoral Campaign in the City and its response at the polls.
2. To manifest to the Government the desire of the Corporation for a prompt holding of municipal elections.
3. That the fact of continuing in our respective positions until the celebration of these elections, even given our uncomfortable situation, we consider it as one more act of service in favor of the city, receiving with pleasure any decision that the Cortes or the Government may adopt in this respect.<sup>21</sup>

The last pre-democratic corporations were in a very precarious situation throughout Spain, given their evident interim nature, but also lacking in representativeness considering the results of the general elections of June 15, 1977. The electorate had shown its preferences and the political transition was bringing about change. Criticism was growing from neighborhood movements, trade unions and political parties.

#### A VOLATILE MUNICIPAL LIFE

Fernando Parias, the mayor of Seville, was aware of the lack of democratic legitimacy, when there was already a democratically elected government and *Cortes*. Parias asked, like other Spanish mayors in those years, for municipal elections to obtain the legitimacy of the ballot box. He also resented the stalling by the government of key projects for the city which would attract investment and create jobs. “Are we the housekeeper or the village idiot?” he personally asked Minister of the Interior Rodolfo Martín Villa (the two men knew each other from their college years in Barcelona). The housekeeper was intended to keep the city until the government prepared the arrival of “its” mayors, under the umbrella of the UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático), led by President Suárez. Those mayors would reap the benefits of the projects designed by Parias. The village idiot, who everyone laughs at, represented the press, neighborhood associations, political parties, unions, etc. In December Parias stated in handwritten notes the urgency of holding municipal elections in March 1978, “or the only Spaniards who are not democrats are the mayors and councilmen.”<sup>22</sup> The petition was unsuccessful. The elections were delayed until April 1979. This was ultimately the main motivation for Parias’s resignation in January 1978. Parias felt close to the UCD project. The press spoke of him as a possible candidate for the coalition in the elections, something that finally did not happen. His predecessor Juan Fernández had also resigned, but on that occasion the reasons were not published. Fernando Parias was substituted as mayor by councilor José Ramón Pérez de Lama.

After the vote on the constitution in a new referendum in December of 1978 and new general elections called for March of 1979, all that remained was the changeover in the local corporations. The instability by January 1979 was tremendous. Only twenty-four of the mayors of capital cities elected in

January 1976 remained, of which twenty-one were “interim” (in Albacete, Alicante, Badajoz, Cáceres, Guadalajara, Las Palmas, León, Lugo, Málaga, Pamplona, Salamanca, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Segovia, Seville, Soria, Teruel, Valladolid, Vitoria, and Zamora). Two were “acting mayors” (Luis Merino in Madrid and Manuel Font in Barcelona), and Ramón Jauregui was listed as “President of the Management Commission” with representation from opposition forces in San Sebastián, since September 1978. He would be replaced in March 1979 by Iñaki Alkiza until the April elections (see Annex).<sup>23</sup>

#### UNCERTAINTY: ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS OF 1979

The elections were called, after many delays, on January 26, and would be held on April 3, 1979. Mayors would be elected democratically again.<sup>24</sup> There would be no continuity in most of the town councils. The councilors were too politically “burned out,” and they knew it. As Fraga, then leader of the right-wing Democratic Coalition, said:

All the parties had difficulties presenting candidates in all the constituencies (more than eight thousand). The Government, which counted on the civil governments, had the advantage; it used it especially against us [sic], literally undoing many of our lists, due to blatant pressures from the governors.<sup>25</sup>

Jose M. Areilza pointed out in March 1977 that almost all “the budding parties integrated in the Center” had “good cadres, but few people. And the municipal infrastructures” were “non-existent”.<sup>26</sup> The Unión de Centro Democrático, a recently created electoral coalition, had obvious advantages. As Salvador Sánchez-Terán recalls, the UCD in general

was formed on three pillars: the first and essential, the figure of President Suárez, at the height of his prestige and image; the second, the power structure controlled by the Government, mainly through the Ministry of the Interior and the Civil Governments, with a relative majority of men coming from the organizations of the single-party Movement, . . . and which included mayors from thousands of Spanish municipalities as a base for action; and the third, the aforementioned coalition of the Democratic Center, which, by including Christian Democrat, Liberal and Social Democrat groups, gave the UCD a certain European and opposition flavor, and placed it more in the political center.<sup>27</sup>

The polling stations would have the same components as in the general elections. In Seville the counting would be carried out in the Civil Government and, as in the general elections, there would be two teams of data transcribers, one for the capital (which would receive the tally sheets by hand), and another for the province (which would receive the results by telephone). As a novelty already used in the general elections, the Civil Government would have a mini-computer with a hard drive that stored and computed the data which would be transmitted through a modem to the Ministry of the Interior in Madrid, where the whole process was coordinated.<sup>28</sup> Finally, in 2033 municipalities there was a single candidacy, automatically elected, so that the municipal elections would take place in just over six thousand

municipalities throughout Spain. It was the fifth electoral process since 1976, after two referendums (on the Law for Political Reform and on the Constitution) and two general elections (6/15/1977 and 3/1/1979). Weariness, and disenchantment, increased. Few rallies were held, and the campaign was described as “semi-silent and disappointing.”<sup>29</sup>

The uncertainty before the municipal elections is evident in the reports on candidacies prepared in various localities, presumably by the police. These reports included the different lists and possible coalitions. Likewise, estimates were made, from 1 to 10, on the possibilities of victory of each candidacy, the degree of confidence they aroused, the number of activities organized, the economic means at their disposal and the environment of their voters. The democratic government wanted to have precise information on the players in thousands of Spanish municipalities, and it resorted to the police to obtain information in a context of great uncertainty.

The report for Morón de la Frontera (some 60 kilometers from Sevilla) is telling of the uncertainty and of the limited information that the government had. The fact the Marxist-Leninist PTA was given the greatest chances of winning the elections in that town in April of 1979 seems now inconceivable (see Table 1).<sup>30</sup>

Party	Options	Degree of Trust	Activities	Econ. means	Social Base
ORT Marxist-Leninist-Maoist	1	1	None (2)	Unknown	Non-qualified workers
PCE Marxist	5	5	Many (5)	(8)	Workers in general
PSOE Marxist	6	7	Many (6)	(9)	Workers, middle-class
PTA Marxist-Leninist	8	8	Many (9)	(9)	Unemployed, unqualified
UCD Center	7	9	Few (5)	(9)	Upper and middle class, also people without political filiation
<i>CD Right (chose not to run in Morón)</i>					

**Table 1.** Report on Candidacies, Municipal Elections Morón de la Frontera, 1979. Source: AMMF.

This report was clearly a projection based on the result of the second general elections in Morón de la Frontera, held one month before the local elections. It made sense at the time, since the PTA had been in fact the most voted party in the general election of March of 1979. In the municipal elections of



April, UCD more than doubled its votes, and obtained more councilors than the three left-wing candidacies combined (see Table 2).<sup>31</sup>

Party	Votes 3/1/79	Percentage	Votes 4/3/79	Percentage	Councillors
PCE Marxist	1,469	11.2	1,100	8.6	2
PSOE Marxist	3,217	24.6	1,524	11.9	5
PTA Marxist-Leninist	3,415	26.1	2,870	22.3	2
UCD Center	3,348	25.6	7,062	54.9	12

**Table 2.** *Comparison of General and Local elections in Morón de la Frontera, 3/1/1979 and 4/3/1979.*  
Source: Spanish Ministry of the Interior, <https://infoelectoral.interior.gob.es/opencms/en/inicio/>.

The same uncertainty was reflected in the letter from the civil government of Seville to the mayors of the province, dated April 3, 1979, regarding the entry into office of the new corporations that would be elected in the elections of that same day. Undoubtedly the memory of what happened after the elections of April 1931 was present:

1. In the illegal occupations of city halls, town halls or any other municipal dependency, the immediate eviction and detention of the occupants would be carried out, instructing the appropriate proceedings that would be sent to the judicial authority. Preventive measures were also contemplated to avoid such occupations.
2. In the case of anticipated assumption of municipal functions by persons who had been elected, they should also be arrested for the alleged crime of anticipation of public functions and punishable under Article 373 of the Penal Code in force.
3. Those persons who are members of the current local corporations who abandon their functions, conduct typified in article 376 of the Penal Code, would incur similar liability.
4. The local corporations shall be constituted on the tenth day following the proclamation of the elected councilors by the Local Electoral Board. The councilmen-elect cannot, therefore, begin to perform their functions as such until they are formally proclaimed, and the constitutive session of the new corporation is held. The current corporations, until the moment of the constitution of the new ones, will therefore continue in the management of all the municipal services.<sup>32</sup>

The first municipal elections since the adoption of the Constitution were finally held on April 3 of 1979, and they yielded an almost complete renewal: only 2 mayors were reelected (Antonio Hormaechea in Santander and José Antonio Llamas in Huesca). On a national scale, the UCD obtained 29,614 councilors; the PSOE, 12,220, and the PCE, 3,608. The so-called Progressive Pact (with nationalist

support in the Catalan and in the Basque Provinces) was signed on April 18 by Alfonso Guerra (PSOE) and Santiago Carrillo (PCE) and allowed the left to rule in most of Spain's main cities: Madrid, Barcelona, Zaragoza, Valencia, and Seville. For Preston, they were a crucial stage of the transition. Despite the remarkable changes in the life of the country since Franco's death, the local administration was still intact at the beginning of 1979. At the municipal level the fear factor, which would have held back many left-wing voters in the general elections, was less potent. The pact between PSOE, PCE and other forces such as PSA and PTA in Andalusia allowed the left to govern in 27 provincial capitals, representing a population of 10,500,000. While UCD, although it won in many rural municipalities, was only able to govern in 23 provincial capitals, representing 2,500,000 people. UCD had 49.4% of the mayoralties, the PSOE 14% and the PCE almost 3%.<sup>33</sup>

Guillermo Márquez Cruz has demonstrated the spectacular character (93.5%) of the renewal of the local elite, the continuity of the local elites coming from Franco's regime was limited to 6.5%. The total number of pre-democratic mandates reconstructed in Andalusia by Márquez Cruz, and which formed part of the municipal corporations partially renewed in 1973 and which continued until the democratic elections of 1979 amounts to 6,423, of which 15.6% are mayors, and 84.4% councilors. This number corresponds to 717 municipalities (92.4%) of the 761 existing in Andalusia in 1979. In the province of Seville, of the 1,050 mandates in 1973, only 123 (11.7%) competed in 1979 and 76 (7.2%) were elected. Candidates competed in 68 of the 103 municipalities and were elected in 55.<sup>34</sup>

Was it convenient to delay the municipal elections until 1979? Manuel Fraga, former minister of the Interior and leader of Democratic Coalition, regretted that the municipal elections had been held so late and so poorly prepared:

They should have been the first ones, already in 1976, as planned . . . I took to one of the first Councils of Ministers in 1976 a reasonable plan to hold serious municipal elections . . . But some ministers (especially Mr. Suárez and Mr. Martín Villa) opposed the idea, with different pretexts . . . and I could only manage to get the mayors elected by the end of that year, when they were to be held at last, according to the Law of Bases of 1975; but the Government born out of the crisis of July 76 suspended them, and then postponed them until now. Once again it has been preferred to start the house from the roof; the municipal elections have been held after two general elections, when it should have been the other way around, starting from the foundations the building of liberties and autonomies.<sup>35</sup>

It seems clear that they wanted to maintain the initiative of the change "from above." The then Minister of the Interior Martín Villa also analyzed, years later, the delay of the municipal elections in Spain. His perspective was different from that of Fraga:

Perhaps it would have been better to have constituted managing commissions throughout Spain, in accordance with the results of the General Elections . . . This would have had, in addition, very important and positive political consequences. There would have been a real training in local

politics. [The opposition parties] would have had to look for people to deal with the real problems: the school, the hospital, or the water supply. With the management committees there would have been a training prior to the [municipal] elections. For the UCD it would also have been a great training as they would have started to discover people.<sup>36</sup>

While the political parties were concluding the post-electoral negotiations, the pre-democratic municipalities were preparing their long-delayed departure from the town halls. Throughout Spain the last plenary session was held after the municipal elections of April 1979, but there would be no staging of the changeover with the democratically elected corporations since

the Government of Madrid decided that the outgoing corporations should not concur with the elected ones and at the moment of their inauguration, a decision motivated, perhaps, by the achievement of a psychological effect of rupture. It should not be interpreted as continuity. “There will be no changeover in the new City Councils,” said the then-Director General, Vicente Capdevila . . . . The system had changed, and it had to be formally noted with such a decision. It was not a fair correspondence to the sacrifice that had been requested, but the policy or at least the chosen procedure had to be accepted.<sup>37</sup>

**TABLE 3:** *Mayors of Spanish Capitals, January 1979 (in **bold** those reelected in April of 1979).* Source: *Fichero de Altos Cargos*, January 1979.

Capital	Mayor	Situation
ALBACETE	Abelardo Sánchez Moreno	<i>Interim</i>
ALICANTE	Ambrosio Lucíañez Piney	<i>Interim</i>
ALMERÍA	Rafael Monterreal Alemán	
ÁVILA	Fernando López Muñoz	
BADAJOS	Luis Movilla Montero	<i>Interim</i>
BARCELONA	Manuel Font Altaba	<i>Acting mayor</i>
BILBAO	José Luis Berasátegui Goicoechea	
BURGOS	José Muñoz Ávila	
CÁCERES	Manuel López y López	<i>Interim</i>
CÁDIZ	Emilio Bertrán y López Linares	
CASTELLÓN	Vicente Pla Broch	
CEUTA	Alfonso Sotelo Azorín	
CIUDAD REAL	Francisco Bernalte Bernardo	
CÓRDOBA	Antonio Alarcón Constant	
CORUÑA	José Manuel Liaño Flores	
CUENCA	Juan Alonso Villalobos Merino	
GERONA	Ignacio de Ribot y de Batlle	
GRANADA	Antonio Morales Souvirón	
GUADALAJARA	Agustín de Grandes Pascual	<i>Interim</i>
HUELVA	Carmelo Romero Núñez	
HUESCA	<b>José Antonio Llamas Almodévar</b>	
JAÉN	Antonio Herrera García	
LAS PALMAS	Gabriel Mejías Pombo	<i>Interim</i>

LEÓN	Óscar Rodríguez Cardet	<i>Interim</i>
LÉRIDA	Ernesto Corbella Albiñana	
LOGROÑO	Narciso San Baldomero y Ruiz de Morales	
LUGO	Jesús Ibáñez Méndez	<i>Interim</i>
MADRID	Luis María Huete Morillo	<i>Acting mayor</i>
MÁLAGA	Luis Merino Bayona	<i>Interim</i>
MELILLA	Luis Cobreros Acero	
MURCIA	Clemente García García	
ORENSE	Celso Vázquez-Gulias Álvarez	<i>Interim</i>
OVIEDO	Eloísa Suárez Suárez	<i>Interim</i>
PALENCIA	José María Garrachón Juárez	
PALMA DE MALLORCA	Paulino Buchens Adrover	
PAMPLONA	Segundo Valimaña Setuain	<i>Interim</i>
PONTEVEDRA	Joaquín Queizán Taboada	
SALAMANCA	Alejandro Pariente Lamas	<i>Interim</i>
SAN SEBASTIÁN	Ramón Jáuregui Atondo	<i>Pte. Comisión Gestora</i>
STA. CRUZ DE TENERIFE	Félix Álvaro Acuña Dorta	<i>Interim</i>
SANTANDER	<b>Antonio Hormaechea Cazón</b>	<i>Interim</i>
SEGOVIA	Maximiliano Fernández García	<i>Interim</i>
SEVILLA	José Ramón Pérez de Lama	<i>Interim</i>
SORIA	Domingo Hergueta Modrego	<i>Interim</i>
TARRAGONA	Esteban Banús Hernández	
TERUEL	Manuel Blasco García	<i>Interim</i>
TOLEDO	Ángel Vivar Gómez	
VALENCIA	Miguel Ramón Izquierdo	
VALLADOLID	Manuel Vidal García	<i>Interim</i>
VITORIA	Ramón Ortiz de Latierro y Martínez de Lecea	<i>Interim</i>
ZAMORA	Fernando Chacón Antón	<i>Interim</i>
ZARAGOZA	Miguel Merino Pinedo	

## NOTES

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